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Ford: Due Process Applied to Utility Rate Increases: State ex rel. Knig

DUE PROCESS APPLIED TO UTILITY RATE
INCREASES:
State ex rel. Knight v. PSC
On January 30, 1975, Monongahela Power Company moved to
increase rates and charges by filing with the Public Service Commission a petition for rate increase amounting to some $30.9 million. Pursuant to the provisions of W. Va. Code § 24-2-4,1 the
Commission deferred implementation of the rate increase until
June 28, 1975, and required Monongahela Power to post bond. The
new rates went into effect on June 28, 1975. Monongahela Power
filed another petition for rate increase on November 30, 1976. The
W. VA. CODE § 24-2-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in pertinent part:
No public utility subject to this chapter shall change, suspend or
annul any rate, joint rate, charge, rental or classification except after
thirty days' notice to the commission and the public . . . . [Tihe com-

mission may, in its discretion, and for good cause shown, allow changes
upon less time than the notice herein specified ....
Whenever there shall be filed with the commission any schedule
stating a change in the rates or charges,

. . .

the commission shall have

authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, to enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such rate [or]
charge

. . .

and, if the commission so orders, it may proceed without

answer or other form of pleading by the interested parties, but upon
reasonable notice, and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon,
the commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the
public utility affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for
such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer
the use of such rate [or] charge, .

.

. but not for a longer period than

one hundred and twenty days beyond the time when such rate [or]
charge. . . would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing, whether
completed before or after the rate [or] charge

. . .

goes into effect, the

commission may make such order in reference to such rate [or] charge
, * . as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after the rate [or]
charge . . . had become effective: Provided, however, that if any such
hearing and decision thereon cannot be concluded within the period of
suspension, .

.

. such rate [or] charge.

. .

shall go into effect at the end

of such period. In such case the commission may require such public
utility to enter into a bond in an amount deemed by the commission to
be reasonable and conditioned for the refund to the persons or parties
entitled thereto of the amount of the excess, plus interest at the rate of
not less than six nor more than ten percent per annum as specified by
the commission, if such rates so put into effect are subsequently determined to be higher than those finally fixed for such utility. . . . No such
accrued interest paid on any such refund shall be deemed part of the cost
of doing business in a subsequent application for changing rates or any
decision thereon.
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second rate increase went into effect on April 28, 1977, and continued under bond at the time of the decision here discussed. The
Commission subsequently determined that the initial rate increase, in effect since June 28, 1975, was excessive and reduced the
increase to $9,037,286. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to
appeal the reduction to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the federal courts, Monongahela Power refunded with
interest the excess amount charged its customers. Refunds were
issued beginning in August 1977.
Relator, Thomas Knight, brought an action petitioning for a
writ of prohibition, alleging that the Public Service Commission
exercised quasi-judicial powers when setting rates, that the Commission's rate-setting procedure 2 was unconstitutional as it violated the guarantee of due process found in the United States and
West Virginia Constitutions, that he had been irreparably harmed
as a result of the Commission's action, and that, consequently, the
Commission was exceeding its authority.
Held: the procedures by which public utilities file for and
obtain rate increases are constitutional from the perspective of
both substantive due process and procedural due process. Writ of
prohibition denied.'
The procedures outlined in W. Va. Code § 24-2-4 provide, in
essence, that utilities may file for rate increases with the Public
Service Commission. After a thirty-day notice period plus, at the
Commission's option, an additional 120-day suspension period, the
rate increase goes into effect conditioned upon a bond being posted
by the utility to guarantee a refund with interest of any overcharges to customers resulting from a subsequent disapproval or
reduction of the rate increase. The provisions of this code section
and the corresponding United States Code section' are practically
identical. The procedures prescribed represent a majority standard
since most states have patterned their corresponding statutes after
the United States Code model.'
The initial finding of a property interest in the relator was
essential to providing a basis for the due process arguments. Consequently, the first major point noted was the "common law right
§ 24-2-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
State ex re. Knight v. Public Service Commission, 245 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va.
1978) (Miller, J., concurring).
49 U.S.C.A. § 15(7) (1978 Cum. Supp.).
See 245 S.E.2d at 151 n.7.
W. VA. CODE
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in the consumer to just and reasonable rates from a government
created monopoly." ' Knight relied primarily upon Allnutt v.
Inglis,7 which states that a publicly bonded monopoly can take
only a reasonable rate for its services.
The court, through Justice Neely, elaborated upon not only
the discussion in Allnutt but the historical developments leading
to the decision and its legal precedents. The court concluded that
the English people had a general abhorrence for monopolies. This
abhorrence was expressed in a statute that simultaneously noted
many instances when the royal prerogative could be exercised to
charter monopolies.' The people had a right to reasonable regulation of these monopolies, implied in the statute. The court stated
that: "It is this reasonable regulation to which the Allnutt case,
supra, speaks in 1810. .

. ."I It

was then noted that there is no

difference between the royal chartered monopolies of 1810 and
public utilities authorized by Chapter 24 of the West Virginia
Code. Consequently, the court agreed with Knight that there was
a common law right to reasonable regulation of governmentcreated monopolies, and that since this right existed before the
adoption of the West Virginia Constitution, it was a property right
protected by the constitution. ° The basis for due process had been
laid.
The second major point raised by Knight was that the statutory scheme for utility rate increases violated the guarantee of
substantive due process. The court noted that the constitution's
guarantee of due process included the concept of substantive due
process." The standard for evaluating whether a statute meets the
standard of substantive due process had been set forth in Harris
v. Calendine2 as: Does the statute "bear a reasonable relationship
to a proper legislative purpose.' The court noted the need to
provide for an adequate return for the utilities while preventing the
charging of exorbitant rates. It was also noted that any delay in a
rate increase, if the new rate is ultimately approved, works to shift
Id. at 148.
12 East. 526, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810).
21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
' 245 S.E.2d at 149.
1oW. VA. CoNST. art. III § 10; art. VIII § 13; W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1971
Replacement Vol.).
" 245 S.E.2d at 150.
12 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977).
1"245 S.E.2d at 150, citing 233 S.E.2d at 324 n.4.
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the cost of current utility service from present to future customers." The court determined that there had been an effective balancing of the competing interests of customers and utility companies, obviously being swayed by decisions from other jurisdictions
upholding the constitutionality of statutes paralleling West Vir-

ginia's.1The court's substantive due process analysis appears to miss
the mark. As is correctly stated by Justice Miller in his concurring
opinion, the United States Supreme Court distinguishes between
cases in which a substantive due process attack is made on a statute of primarily economic significance and a statute that directly
violates sensitive personal rights. In the former case the Court does
not act unless the legislative action is wholly arbitrary and irrational."6 When sensitive personal rights are in danger, the Court's
examination of legislative action is particularly close. 7 The concurring opinion noted that "[tihe legislative purpose of the statutes is primarily economic and they evidence a reasonable attempt
to balance the competing economic interests."' 8 Therefore, the statutory provisions in question are not in violation of the precepts of
substantive due process. 9
When dealing with questions of substantive due process, the
United States Supreme Court is always hesitant to overturn legislative enactments. The Court attempted to impose its own view as
to what is "reasonable" in the economic arena in Lochner v. New
11Id. at 152.

Id.
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
1' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" 245 S.E.2d at 154.
" The point made by the concurring justice is particularly applicable to this
decision. The majority cited Harris v. Calendinefor the proposition that the court
will intervene in acts of the legislature that "do not bear a reasonable relationship
to a proper legislative purpose." 245 S.E.2d at 150, citing 233 S.E.2d at 324 n.4.
Calendine concerned a juvenile who was adjudged delinquent after missing fifty
days of school and sent to a forestry camp where he was confined with juveniles
guilty of criminal acts. The court determined that the statute in question was
constitutional but had been applied in an arbitrary, unconstitutional fashion.
Calendine involved precisely the type of sensitive rights reviewable under the
stricter Supreme Court standard noted in the text. The majority in Knight appears
to have applied the easier standard utilized in sensitive rights cases to a statutory
scheme concerned with economic regulation.
'
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York" and its progeny.21 This attempt was a dismal failure and the
Court abandoned substantive due process as a basis for review of
legislative action in Nebbia v. New York.2 The Court remained so
hesitant about imposing its own view over that of legislative bodies
that substantive due process remained dormant until the privacy
decisions.2 Even today, when there is a more activist judiciary and
a rebirth of substantive due process, the Court rarely closely examines statutes with essentially economic impact. No economic legislation has been overturned by the Court on substantive due process
24
grounds since the era of the New Deal.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, while determining that the statute attacked did not violate substantive due process, has perhaps set the stage for future examinations of economic
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
51Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
= 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court's attempt to impose its wisdom on the Congress was greeted with singular unpopularity. It resulted in President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the Court with justices more amenable to leaving
intact his New Deal legislation. The paramount problem faced by the Court was
the absolute lack of standards in evaluating economic legislation. There was also
an almost total lack of competence in the area. As was noted by Learned Hand,
"the legislature, with its paraphernalia of committee and commission, is the only
public representative really fitted to experiment [with economic legislation]."
Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HRv.L. Rxv. 495, 508
(1908). As has also been noted, Lochner was "the focal point in a judicial move to
fasten on the country by constitutional exegesis unsanctioned by the Constitution,
a pattern of economic organization believed by the Court to be essential to fullest
development of the nation's economy." Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure,and Emasculation, 15 A~iz. L. REv. 419, 419 (1973).
The retreat from Lochner has been complete. In Fergusonv. Skrupa the Court
stated:
Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to
legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.
There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court
to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or
incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy. ...
The doctrine . . . has long since been discarded.
372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1962). The Court expressly overturned one of the few remaining substantive due process precedents, Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928), in N.D. State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., terming
Liggett a "derelict in the stream of the law." 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
= Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24 J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLicy 434
(1975).
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regulatory statutes from this standpoint. Such a course of action
by the court would be dangerous as it could ultimately lead to the
same types of problems encountered by the Nebbia era Supreme
Court. This danger is particularly acute with the present West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which appears to have a certain proclivity for judicial legislation.
The procedural due process question in Knight hinged upon
the provisions of W. Va. Code § 24-2-4. It was argued that these
provisions violated the guarantee of procedural due process in that
the procedure specified in the statute was inadequate to protect
Knight's common-law property right to a reasonable utility rate. 5
The court relied for authority upon the second syllabus point
of North v. West Virginia Board of Regents:"
First, the more valuable the right sought to be deprived, the
more safeguards will be interposed. Second, due process must
generally be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise. Third, a temporary
deprivation of rights may not require as large a measure of
procedural due process protection as a permanent deprivationY
This syllabus point proved fatal to Knight's argument. The court
recognized that even a temporary deprivation of money with a
subsequent refund with interest worsened Knight's already precarious financial condition, but the court also recognized that the
deprivation was admittedly temporary and consisted of a relatively
small sum. Contrasting Knight's predicament to cases in which
severe deprivation had occurred due to violations of procedural due
process,2 the court determined that Knight had little about which
to complain. The court also noted the compelling public policy
against requiring pre-hearings, and accurately observed that the
result of delaying a rate increase would be to shift the increase to
later customers.2 The court then summarily concluded that the
procedural safeguards were adequate to protect relator's property

right."
The majority's opinion was cursory at best. There seemingly
245 S.E.2d at 153.
- 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
2

245 S.E.2d at 153.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Smoot v. Dingess, 236 S.E.2d 468 (W.
Va. 1977); North v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
2 245 S.E.2d at 153.

w Id.
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was an abrupt conclusion that the statutory procedure did not
violate procedural due process, and that this fact should be selfevident to the reader. Fortunately, the concurring opinion provided a more comprehensive analysis of the procedural due process
question. Justice Miller noted that the majority did not follow the
procedural due process analysis in Waite v. Civil Service
Commission." This point shows a major flaw in the majority opinion. Justice Miller authored both Waite and North v. West Virginia Board of Regents."2 In Waite, Miller expanded upon the opinion and analysis in North. Of particular interest is the following:
"Further refinement of these principles [the North test] was not
necessary to the resolution of North because of the serious deprivation that had occurred. Here, we have a temporary deprivation and
a more selective test is appropriate."" The majority in Knight
offered no reason for ignoring the later test set forth in Waite
designed specifically for cases of temporary deprivation of a property right. The Waite analysis required the initial finding of a
property interest, as did the test applied by the majority in Knight.
The concurring opinion differed by questioning the existence of a
common law right to reasonable utility rates. The difference became irrelevant, however, because there undoubtedly was a statutory entitlement under W. Va. Code § 24-2-4, which suffices for the
Waite analysis. Once the property interest is identified, three standards set forth in the fifth syllabus point of Waite must be met:
The extent of due process protection affordable for a property
interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the
private interests that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the government's interests, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.u
In applying the Waite analysis to the facts of Knight, it becomes obvious that the customer not only will pay a higher rate
during the period that the rate increase is in effect under bond, but
also that he will automatically receive a refund of any amount
overcharged. Also of significance is that the utility is forbidden

3

241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
241 S.E.2d at 169.
Id. at 165.
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from charging customers for any interest it may be forced to pay
on refunds. Second, while the risk of erroneous deprivation is not
totally impossible, this risk is balanced against the fact that the
amount in question would not be large and that there would be the
often-mentioned refund with interest. Finally, the increased burden on the state to comply with the procedural safeguards requested by Knight would be considerable."
A significant additional consideration supporting Justice
Miller's conclusion that Knight could not be afforded additional
procedural safeguards concerned the particular nature of his complaint. It was noted that property deprivation cases fall into two
general categories. First are cases in which a statute authorizes a
possessory action by the state with no opportunity on the part of
the citizen to be heard prior to the action." A second type of case
involves situations in which a property right has been granted by
statute or regulatory procedure, and it has been held that its subsequent removal by state action must be in accordance with due
process standards. 7 Both types of cases fit within the scope of
matters reviewable by the judiciary because the right to be deprived is a personal possessory interest which the individual can
identify and the court can protect. Just and reasonable utility rates
do not favorably compare with the interests protected in the cases
noted above. The individual's deprivation is caused by economic
forces beyond his comprehension or control, not state action alone.
Further, the interest is not a personalized right of the customer,
as would be, for example, the right to a government job. Rate
increases are, consequently, not the type of matter that should be
resolved by the courts. "The whole fabric of the proceeding is
peculiarly suited to the administrative forum, such that engrafting
the adversary legal system into it seems ill advised."38
The majority opinion noted the legislative history of the West
245 S.E.2d at 155.
245 S.E.2d at 156. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v:Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3 245 S.E.2d at 156. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 98
S. Ct. 1554 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Waite v. Civil Service
Commission, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977); Beverlin v. Board of Education, 216
S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
1 245 S.E.2d at 156.
31
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Virginia statute and its federal counterpart, 9 as well as attempts
to overturn as unconstitutional like statutes in other jurisdictions." Clearly, the type of regulatory scheme utilized by West
Virginia has passed the test of constitutionality more than once.
Further, rate increases do seem to be the type of matter best left
to the legislative and administrative bodies unless there is the
evidence of wholly arbitrary action required for intervention by the
United States Supreme Court. The scheme in question does demonstrate a reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests
of the consumer and the utility. While it is difficult for anyone to
sympathize with an electric company that complains of a shortage
of capital, it is at least arguable that unless rate increases take
effect as soon as requested, later customers will pay for present
service. Balanced against a temporary deprivation of money which
is returned with interest, the procedures in effect are surely adequate to protect the citizen's right to reasonable utility rates.
Thus, the decision in Knight is correct, although better reasoning
is found in the concurring opinion; it comports with current judicial thinking on due process on the federal and state levels in all
regards, and in regard to fixing utility rates in particular.
Larry Ford
' Id.
40 Id.

at 151.

at 152.
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